The Japanese were part of the Tripartite Pact signed with Germany and Italy in September 1940. That meant that they were supposed to attack Mother Russia in the Far East when Operation Barbarossa began.

The Japanese lost their nerve and never upheld their part of the agreement. That meant that the Russian Siberian divisions could be redeployed to defend Moscow.


Emperor Hirohito (1901
1989).
Misruled Japan from 1926 to 1989.

Like the Nazis in Germany, the Japanese were total slaves of Emperor Hirohito.

Hirohito owed Churchill a favor because he refused to order an attack on Mother Russia.

The British invented the tank during WWI, and they were the first to use an aircraft carrier in battle.

 

Japanese Zeros on flight deck ready
to bomb Pearl Harbor.

Royal Navy nautical engineers worked closely with the Japanese navy. They put special emphasis on the aircraft carrier as a powerful new weapon of war. Of course, the Japanese and the British always saw Mother Russia as their primary foe.

The Hawaiian Islands were discovered by Captain Cook accidentally while he was desperately searching for the mouth of the Columbia River. He treated the natives contemptuously, and he suffered the same fate as the arrogant Ferdinand Magellan.

The British Empire–using the Japanese Navy as their mercenaries–launched a "surprise" attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941....The subsequent cover-up is the mother of all conspiracies!!

Since 1929, the British had a listening post in Singapore which monitored all radio communications in China and Japan. In 1937, the Japanese introduced a much more complicated encryption machine code named Magic. The brilliant cryptologist, Frank B. Lovett, actually constructed a duplicate of the Japanese machine without ever seeing the original. Churchill begged the U.S. for a copy, and 2 machines were delivered to London in June 1941.

In January 1941, the quartet traveled by train to Baltimore and boarded the 35,000-ton British battleship HMS King George V, which had just arrived with the new British ambassador, Lord Halifax. Their precious cargo of Purple machines was swung on board and locked away below, with the only keys being held by them. Since no one on board knew what the group of Americans was doing and they could not discuss their mission, Sinkov recalls they were treated with considerable reserve by the officers during the long voyage, which finally ended at Scapa Flow. (Rusbridger & Nave, Betrayal at Pearl Harbor, p. 109).

Commanding the Singapore spying station was a brilliant Australian linguist and cryptographer named Captain Eric Nave. Nave forwarded all the JN-25 naval codes on to Churchill for decryption by the Purple machines.

Churchill ordered HMAS Sydney sunk as target practice for the Japanese!!

As target practice for the upcoming attack on Pearl Harbor, Churchill ordered the Japanese to sink the Australian ship HMAS Sydney with a crew of 645.

Captain Eric Nave
Captain Eric Nave
(1899
1993).

Australian born Captain Eric Nave was a brilliant cryptographer and linguist who understood Japanese perfectly.

He was in charge of the British spying station in Singapore.

After Churchill received the 2 Purple machines from the U.S., the Japanese Navy had no more secrets.


Captain Nave on HMAS
Sydney
, 1925.

In order to ensure that there would be no peace with the Japanese, and as target practice for the upcoming attack on Pearl Harbor, Churchill ordered HMAS Sydney sunk in November 1941.

Captain J. Burnett
Captain J. Burnett
(1985
1941).

The war in the "Pacific" actually began with the sinking of HMAS Sydney on Nov. 19, 1941.

Captain Burnett and his crew of 645 souls were all lost.

Of course, the Germans were blamed for the sinking, but it was a test of the new British designed Japanese torpedoes.

Battle cruiser HMAS Sydney.
Battle cruiser HMAS Sydney was
sunk with a loss of 645.

Very soon after the sinking of HMAS Sydney, President's Roosevelt's attitude to the Japanese ambassador in Washington City changed completely:

Churchill may also have told Roosevelt that the Australians believed the Sydney had been sunk by a Japanese submarine. Although this would certainly have confirmed the treacherous nature of the Japanese, it would not have caused Roosevelt to react so strongly, as it had not involved an American warship. (Rusbridger & Nave, Betrayal at Pearl Harbor, p. 143).

Like the Manhattan Project, it is very doubtful if President Roosevelt had access to the top secret Purple intercepts. The British certainly knew every move that the Japanese Navy made from their spying base in Singapore.

The U.S. Pacific Fleet was stationed in San Diego in May 1940

Even though Churchill had 2 copies of the Purple encryption machines, no copies were sent to Admiral Kimmel at Pearl Harbor. This left the admiral blind and a perfect set-up for the "surprise attack."

Burning battleships at Pearl Harbor.
Burning battleships at Pearl Harbor.

Until May 1940, the United States Pacific Fleet was stationed at San Diego.

The fleet was forward deployed just in time for the "surprise"Japanese attack.

 

Pearl Harbor Memorial.
Pearl Harbor Memorial.

From January 1940 to February 1941, Admiral Richardson commanded the United States Pacific Fleet. The patriotic admiral deplored the forward deployment of the fleet from its headquarters in San Diego to Pearl Harbor.

Admiral Richardson
Admiral Richardson
(1878
1974).

Admiral Richardson was removed from command in February 1941.

He was replaced by Admiral Kimmel.

The cooperative Kimmel was to be the fall guy or patsy who would take the blame for the "surprise" attack.

Admiral Kimmel
Admiral Kimmel
(1882
1968).

Admiral Kimmel only received a slap on the wrist for allowing the "surprise" attack, as he was downgraded from a four-star admiral to a two-star or rear admiral.

Admirals Chūichi Nagumo and Isoroku Yamamoto commanded the Imperial Japanese Fleet during the "surprise" attack.

Admiral Nagumo
Admiral
Nagumo
(1887
1944).

Admirals Nagumo and Yamamoto commanded the Japanese Imperial Fleet during the "surprise" attack.

Admiral Nagumo "suicided" in 1944, and Admiral Yamamoto was hunted down and killed because "dead men tell no tales."

 

Admiral Yamamoto
Admiral Yamamoto
(18841943).

The entire Japanese plan of conquest was already laid out in a book written by a British Secret Service agent named Hector C. Bywater.

The Japanese blueprint for war was the work of Hector C. Bywater!!

In 1925, a top British Secret Service agent named Hector C. Bywater published an inflammatory novel about a war between Imperial Japan and the United States. It was called The Great Pacific War. The title was an oxymoron because pacific means peaceful.

Bywater was an expert on all the navies of the world. Before World War I he was a British spy in Germany, using a U.S. passport as cover. After the war, he worked as a "reporter" for the British owned New York Herald and the Baltimore Sun.

Hector. C. Bywater
Hector. C. Bywater
(1884
1940).

Bywater's 1925 book was published by Houghton Mifflin in Boston.

He predicted a "Pacific War" between the U.S. and Japan starting in 1931.

He predicted initial U.S. casualties as 2,500 killed,

The book was soon translated into Japanese and widely read in Japan.

 

The Great Pacific War
The Great Pacific War
by Hector C. Bywater.

The proud Japanese were incensed by the fact that Bywater predicted their defeat in the end. Not one place in the 321-page book does Bywater mention the vital role that codebreaking would play in the coming war.

Bywater never mentioned that the Japanese cipher was broken in 1921

In modern warfare, signals intelligence plays a vital role. This is more so in the vast distances of the Pacific Ocean. If the Japanese had known that their naval code was broken, they never would have started their suicidal war.

Bywater predicted that the Japanese would lose in the end . . . and this prediction incensed the proud Japanese!

The Japanese believed that their ciphers were absolutely secure and that no nation could listen in on their communications. In this they were sadly mistaken....A brilliant cryptographer named Herbert O. Yardley, working for the Signal Corps, was as determined to solve their ciphers as Champollion was determined to solve the Rosetta Stone. He did it in the same way as Champollion by concentrating on the proper names found in the code.

Yardley's tell all book was
Yardley's tell-all book was
published in 1931.
 

An important naval conference was held in Washington City in 1921 between the United States, Britain, France, Italy and Japan.

Called the Five-Power Treaty, it limited the size of each country's navy.

The Japanese diplomatic code was broken and their final bargaining position was known in advance.

 

 
Yardley's tell all book was
Herbert O. Yardley
(1886
1958).

Here is a short quote from Yardley's eye-opening book:

At last on November 28, 1921, the Black Chamber deciphered what I consider the most important and far reaching telegram that ever passed through its doors. A photograph of the code message itself and the Japanese decoded text are shown on facing page. It is from the Japanese Foreign Office to the Japanese Plenipotentiary in Washington. It is the first sign of weakness on the ten-to-seven Japanese demands. This telegram was definitely to determine the respective strength of the fleets of Japan and the United States. It shows that if America presses Japan vigorously, Japan will give up proposal 1, then proposal 2, and that provided the status quo of the Pacific defenses is maintained, she will even accept a ten-to-six naval ratio. (Yardley, The American Black Chamber, pp. 312-313).

The Washington Treaty for Naval Disarmament was held from December 1921 to February 1922.

The Washington Naval Conference was
The Washington Naval Conference was
held from Nov. 1921 to Feb. 1922.

Yardley worked feverishly to solve the Japanese cipher and was at last rewarded with success.

He compared the advantage to reading an opponent's hand in a poker game.

Deciphered Japanese telegram to Washington Naval Conference.
Deciphered Japanese telegram to Washington Naval Conference.

During World War I, Yardley and his team worked for the Signal Corps in the Army War College.

Yardley worked for the Signal Corps
Yardley worked for the Signal Corps
in the Army War College until 1923.
 

From July 1917, Yardley worked as a commissioned officer in the Army Signal Corps, housed in the Army War College.

In 1923, funding for cryptology was cut by Congress, so Yardley moved to a secret location in Manhattan at 52 Vanderbilt Ave.

He worked there until his firing in 1929.

 

 
52 Vanderbilt Ave., in Manhattan.
52 Vanderbilt Ave., in Manhattan.

When the U.S. Navy played war games during the 1920's, their main opponent was the Royal Navy . . . and not the Japanese. The next big disarmament conference was scheduled to take place in 1929 between Britain and the United States. Yardley and his team were determined once again to play a major role in the conference. At that time, Yardley was fired, and the Black Chamber was closed.

The Black Chamber was disbanded in 1929

Henry L. Stimson was appointed Secretary of State in January 1929. From 1930 to 1931, Stimson was the Chairman of the U.S. delegation to the London Naval Conference.

Henry L. Stimson (1867 - 1950). Sec. of War '41 - '45).
Henry L. Stimson (1867
1950).
Sec. of State from '29 to '33.

In 1929, Stimson closed the Black Chamber because he said "Gentlemen do not read each other's mail."

In reality, he established the Signal Intelligence Service (SIS) under the War Department.

Patrick J. Hurley presided over the birth of the Signal Intelligence Service, which later morphed into NSA.

 

Patrick J. Hurley
Patrick J. Hurley
(1883
1963).
Sec. of War from '29 to '33.

Under the Secretary of War, the Black Chamber was reborn as the Signal Intelligence Service, with full funding from the government:

At seventeen minutes past the hour of ten o'clock on the morning of April 24, 1930, the Signal Intelligence Service was born. It was at that moment that the chief signal officer officially received the order from the Secretary of War setting out the duties and responsibilities of the new organization. As first head of the SIS, Friedman found that his new responsibilities included the "preparation and revision of Army codes and ciphers and, in time of war, interception of enemy radio and wire traffic, the goniometric location of enemy radio stations, the solution of intercepted enemy code and cipher messages, and laboratory arrangements for the employment and detection of secret inks." (Bamford, The Puzzle Palace, p.29-30).

In disgust, and in desperate need of money during the Great Depression, Yardley wrote a tell-all book about the Black Chamber. It was a bestseller in many countries, and especially Japan, where it sold over 40,000 copies. Naturally, the Japanese were incensed that their telegrams to the conference were read, but they claimed that Yardley had gained access to their embassy, and read the deciphered telegrams!!

Following up on the success of his book, Yardley planned on writing another book entitled Japanese Diplomatic Secrets. The book was never published because Hurley passed a law making it a crime for government employees to divulge state secrets:

Whoever, by virtue of his employment by the United States, obtains from another or has or has had custody of or access to, any official diplomatic code or any matter prepared in any such code, or which purports to have been prepared in any such code, and without authorization or competent authority, willfully publishes or furnishes to another any such code or matter, or any matter which was obtained while in the process of transmission between any foreign government and its diplomatic mission in the United States, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both. (United States Code, Title 18, Section 952).

The Bill was signed into law by President Roosevelt on June 10, 1933, and the law is still in effect. The Japanese were reassured that United States spying had ended with the death of the Black Chamber.

The Black Chamber was reborn as the Signal Intelligence Service in 1930

After World War I, the Black Chamber was really a clandestine organization, with little funding, but the new Signal Intelligence Service, headed by the War Department, had unlimited financing.

William F. Friedman was appointed to head up this new forerunner of NSA. Friedman had little talent as a cryptographer; his wife Elizabeth had all the brains, but he was discreet, and that was his main qualification for the position.

Major William F. Friedman
Major William F. Friedman
(1891
1969).

Major William F. Friedman was in charge of the new spying department.

Frank B. Rowlett did the actual breaking of the code but Friedman later claimed credit for the groundbreaking deciphering.

 

Frank B. Rowlett
Frank B. Rowlett
(1908
1998).

Headquarters for the reborn Black Chamber was in the Munitions Building next to the Navy Department.

SIS was housed in the Munitions Building next to the Navy Department.
SIS was housed in the Munitions Building
next to the Navy Department.

The top secret SIS was housed in the Munitions Building next to the Navy Department from 1930 until 1942.

This was the HQ of Friedman, Frank Rowlett, and the other members of the cryptographic team. =

 

Arlington Hall was the HQ of SIS from 1942 until it morphed into NSA in 1952.
Arlington Hall was the HQ of SIS from 1942
until it morphed into NSA in 1952.

In 1937, the Japanese introduced a new code based on the Polish and German Enigma machines. Friedman's outfit called it Purple, and it was modified and complicated by Japanese innovations. The machine had the capability of using millions of variables to encode information.

Without ever seeing a Japanese encryption machine, Rowlett constructed one from sheer guesswork, and it bore an uncanny resemblance to the Japanese original.

A German Enigma machine.
A German Enigma machine.
 

Encryption was automated and became highly complicated with the introduction of the Polish and German Enigma machines.

The Japanese adopted Enigma, but added more complications to an already baffling machine.

Frank B. Rowlett finally solved it a year before Pearl Harbor.

 
The highly complicated Japanese Purple machine.
The highly complicated Japanese Purple machine.

The team under Friedman worked on this new naval code and Frank B. Rowlett finally broke it in 1940. The proud Japanese did not even consider that their code was broken, and their British sponsors did nothing to enlighten them.

Bywater and Yamamoto were eliminated because they knew too much!!

Bywater and Yamamoto were eliminated because they might talk and reveal the identity of the puppetmasters behind the "surprise" attack on Pearl Harbor.

Isoroku Yamamoto with United States Secretary of the Navy Curtis D. Wilbur.
Isoroku Yamamoto with United States
Secretary of the Navy Curtis D. Wilbur.
 

Admiral Yamamoto was a Japanese naval attaché in Washington City from 1926 to 1928.

He "discovered" Bywater's book and had it translated into Japanese.

Bywater met Yamamoto face to face in London in 1934 and the Japanese adopted the Bywater plan completely.

 
Isoroku Yamamoto met
Isoroku Yamamoto met
Bywater in London in 1934.

Here is a short quote from a Bywater biography:

If Europe's leaders were in Bywater's thrall, the same could be said many times over for those in Japan where for so long British seagoing traditions had aroused admiration and envy. In particular, Bywater's proposal for naval arms limitation published in the Telegraph in 1933 struck a responsive chord in Japan. Eventually, the Imperial Navy adopted his proposal as its official position, and it was none other than Isoroku Yamamoto who turned up in London in October 1934 to present the idea to representatives of the Western powers gathered for the Preliminary Naval Limitation Conference. Listening to Yamamoto make the case, one might say that the script he recited had been virtually written by Hector Bywater. It is not possible to know whether Yamamoto was aware of the origin of the proposal he was urging, but if he was, it can only have raised his estimation of Bywater and in that way perhaps, heightened his respect for the British expert's ideas about what steps Japan might take if arms limitation failed.
Toward the end of the conference, at which Yamamoto's proposal was ultimately rejected by the Western powers, Bywater and Yamamoto met face to face and whiled away the better part of the evening discussing international relations in the Pacific. (Honan, Visions of Infamy, pp. 217-218).

It was feared that both nautical men had "loose lips."

Admiral Yamamoto just days before
Admiral Yamamoto just days
before he was shot down.

 

On April 18, 1943, Admiral Yamamoto was ambushed and shot down by 16 fighter aircraft.

Thanks to Purple, the admiral's itinerary was well known in advance.

Bywater had a timely demise in August 1940.

As a nautical expert, Bywater should have known that "loose lips sink ships."

 
Bywater in London days before his timely death.
Bywater in London days
before his timely death.

Yamamoto's body was found with a small caliber bullet wound to the back of his head. He was cremated shortly after the ambush to hide the real cause of his death.

Only the Day of Judgment will reveal the exact reason for the timely death of these 2 men. Bywater might have tried to warn the Japanese that their codes were broken and thus prevented the suicidal attack on Pearl Harbor:

At the inquest the following day at the Richmond Police Court, the coroner accepted Dr. Geare's opinion and jotted down: "Sudden death. No suspicion of foul play." Then, in accordance with the wishes of the deceased, as made known by Ulysses Bywater, the remains were cremated at the Mortlake Crematorium, thus foreclosing the possibility of further scientific inquiry.(Honan, Visions of Infamy, p. 247).
Pagan cremation became popular in Britain around the turn of the 20th century and it is a good way to hide the evidence of foul play.

References

Agawa, Hiroyuki. The Reluctant Admiral: Yamamoto And The Imperial Navy. Kodansha Intl., New York, 1979.

Alvarez, David. Secret Messages: Codebreaking And American Diplomacy. University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, 2000.

Bamford, James. The Puzzle Palace: A Report on America's Most Secret Agency. Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, 1982.

Bywater, Hector C. The Great Pacific War: A History of the American-Japanese Campaign of 1931–33. Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, 1925.

Campbell, Colin. The Queen Mother: The Untold Story Of Elizabeth Bowes-Lyon, Who Became Queen Elizabeth The Queen Mother. St. Martin's Press. New York, 2012.

Honan, William H. Visions of Infamy: The Untold Story of How Journalist Hector C. Bywater Devised The Plans That Led to Pearl Harbor. St. Martin's Press, New York, 1991.

Kahn, David. The Reader of Gentlemen's Mail: Herbert O. Yardley and the Birth of American Codebreaking. Yale University Press, 2004.

Kahn, David.The Codebreakers: The Story of Secret Writing. Scribner, New York, 1996.

Persico, Joseph E. Roosevelt's Secret War. FDR And World War II Espionage. Random House, New York, 2001.

Pfennigwoerth, Ian. A Man of Intelligence; The Life of Captain Theodore Eric Nave. Rosenberg Publishing, NSW, 2006.

Russbridger, James, & Nave, Eric. Betrayal At Pearl Harbor: How Churchill Lured Roosevelt into World War II. Simon & Schuster, New York, 1991.

Montgomery, Michael. Who Sank the Sydney. Hoppocrene Books, New York, 1891.

Stinnett, Robert B. Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR And Pearl Harbor. The Free Press, New York, 2000.

Yardley, Herbert O. The American Black Chamber. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland.


Copyright © 2013 by Patrick Scrivener


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